AI Pentest for LLMs, agents and AI-integrated applications. We test along the OWASP LLM Top 10 and beyond: from prompt injection and tool abuse to the classic vulnerabilities in the AI backend.
What the user types, and what the system reads on the side: emails, documents, websites.
Directly via the input or indirectly via external data.
The instructions meant to define the behaviour, including the tool descriptions.
Bypass guardrails, override the role, extract the system prompt.
Vector database and document store supply the context for the answer.
Unauthorised retrieval, manipulated vector base, membership inference.
The agent reads mailboxes, executes code, queries databases.
Unauthorised tool calls, privilege escalation, SSRF and path traversal.
The answer ends up in the browser, in a database query, in a script.
Unfiltered output turns into XSS, SQL injection or code execution.
Findings we actually exploited, with reproduction steps
Every finding mapped to the OWASP LLM Top 10
Management summary and recommendations prioritised by business impact
Re-test after remediation on request
Prompt injection, excessive agency, output handling, hidden context exposure. For internal assistants and public AI products.
For autonomous agents with tool access: tool authorisation, privilege escalation, indirect prompt injection, multi-agent trust boundaries.
The model itself: adversarial robustness, model extraction, evasion attacks on fraud detection and image recognition.
Which focus fits depends on the system and its maturity. We often combine all three.
Crafted inputs steer the output, directly or indirectly.
Training data, configuration or data from other sessions.
The agent may do more than its task requires.
Compromised base models, plugins or data pipelines.
Manipulated training data creates targeted backdoors.
Expensive requests force DoS and high API costs.
Plausible-sounding false statements with real impact.
System prompt, tool schemas and rules can be extracted.
Poisoning and unauthorised retrieval in the vector base.
Output is passed on unfiltered, as code or as a query.
Which models, data sources and tools are in scope, and what permissions does the agent have?
Derive attack paths from the architecture, following the OWASP LLM Top 10, MITRE ATLAS and our own test cases.
Prompt injections, tool abuse, RAG attacks, API tests. Every attempt is logged.
Every finding is checked for actual exploitability and impact.
Report with OWASP LLM mapping, reproduction steps and management summary.
Your risk lies in the configuration, not in the provider's model. How is the system prompt built, which data may the assistant retrieve, do your permissions still hold when a user helps things along with prompt injection? That is your implementation, and that is what we test.
For a black-box assessment, the access a normal user has is enough. Grey box and white box, meaning insight into system prompts, tool configuration and architecture, lead to deeper findings. We clarify which approach fits during scoping.
The attack does not come from the user but from the data the model reads: an email, a document, a website. If an agent reads a prepared email and then triggers an action, the attacker never had any contact with the system.
A classic test examines infrastructure, network and application. An AI Pentest adds the model-specific vectors: prompt injection, jailbreaking, tool abuse, RAG poisoning, adversarial inputs. Because AI systems run on normal infrastructure, we do both.
In a free initial call we clarify architecture, scope and test model. After that you receive a written proposal.